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ABSTRACT
The end of cold war levels of defense expenditures has promoted the reduction in the
number of defense-related companies, creating potential monopolistic economic scenarios
for defense procurement. This thesis studies one methodology to deal with these scenarios,
based on the Baron-Myerson monopolist regulation mechanism.
The Baron-Myerson mechanism provides a tool to regulate monopolists when their
costs are unknown or cannot be measured, because it is designed as to compel the producer
to reveal its costs by maximizing the company's profit when it announces their true value.
The government presents a modified purchasing plan to the producer, buys according to the
announced costs and pays a subsidy (or levies a tax) to the producer.
To apply Baron-Myerson the government needs to know the demand for the good or
service it requires, and an estimate of probability density function for the possible costs of
the project. This second assumption is the issue addressed in this thesis.
The thesis establishes selection criteria and policy recommendations that the
government can use to choose a probability density function for the application of Baron-
Myerson. The criteria is based on the maximization of the expected government gain, given
the level of efficiency of the producer. Also, an analysis of the policy implications of the
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I. INTRODUCTION.
As the defense industrial base becomes smaller due to the reduced demand of defense
goods, the problem of dealing with a small number of contractors to procure a good or
service becomes significant for the government. The end of cold war levels of defense
expenditures has promoted the consolidation of companies and a reduction in the number of
service providers for the Department of Defense, creating monopolistic economic scenarios
for defense procurement. This thesis studies one methodology to deal with these scenarios,
based on the Loeb-Magat and Baron-Myerson monopolist regulation mechanisms.
These mechanism were originally motivated by the need to regulate public utilities such
as electric and telephone service providers, and must be adapted to deal with the defense
environment. In a common regulation scheme, a government agency imposes certain rules
upon the providers of goods and services to avoid the excessive extraction of surplus from
the consumers by the producers. For the purposes of this thesis, the regulator and the
consumers are the same: the defense agency that needs to procure a good or service. This
condition simplifies many of the assumptions that the regulation mechanism requires, such
as knowing the demand the government has for goods and services provided by a
contractor.
The privileged information that the contractors possesses about the technology and
effort needed to produce the goods and services, gives them an inherent informational
advantage over the government. The government has to "guess" the range of these
parameters and base its policy on this belief, since the real values are only known to the
contractors. This thesis studies the effect of this "educated guess" in the outcome of the
application of the Baron-Myerson mechanism to defense procurement. The outcome is
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measured in terms of expected gain (either of the government or of the producer of the
good or service) since only a statistical description is available for the cost parameters.
To focus the study of the effect of the government belief about the contractor's costs,
this thesis considers only one dimension of the problem: the relative distribution of the cost
parameters. The government belief will be "more favorable" as it consider firms with costs
parameters that take relatively low values ("efficient" firms). Similarly, the government
belief will be "less favorable" as it consider firms with cost parameters that take relatively
high values ("inefficient" firms). Therefore, this thesis would help to predict the
consequences of pursuing different policies regarding the procurement of goods in the
overall welfare of the consumer (government) and the producer (firm). The policies may be
either aggressive, when they allow only the efficient contractors to operate, or
conservative, allowing less efficient firms contribute to the outcome.
Summarizing, the major goal of this work is to provide policy guidelines for the
selection of a "government belief', based on its impact on the expected outcome that this
policy will produce. Previous theses have analyzed the problem using uniform and linear
probability density functions. In this thesis, the analysis is extended to a larger class of
probability density functions.
In Chapter II, the basic theoretical tools needed for the analysis of the problem are
described, mostly in a qualitative manner to help the intuitive understanding of the methods
involved in the policy. Also, a more precise definition of what a "more favorable" decision
means is outlined.
Chapter III summarizes the main results obtained from the analysis, giving the
conditions under which the government gain is maximized. The basic assumption made in
this chapter is that the government does not know the real cost distribution of the
contractor, therefore accepting a mismatch between the reality and the government's belief.
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The effect on the contractor's behavior is also studied, since the application of the Baron-
Myerson mechanism will create very specific incentive structures for the firm.
In Chapter IV the strategic choice problem of the government is analyzed. This chapter
provides guidelines for the selection of a policy instrument when the government is faced
with more than one option to apply the Baron-Myerson mechanism.
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the conclusions of the study and recommendations are
formulated for the application of this methodology in the procurement arena.
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.
This chapter introduces the basic theoretical results and practical applications of some
of the previous efforts for the regulation of monopolists that have an informational
advantage over the institutions assigned to govern them. First, the notion of truth revealing
mechanism is introduced by the explanation of the Loeb-Magat regulation mechanism
[Ref. 11. Next, this basic approach is extended as Baron and Myerson did [Ref. 2], to
improve the outcome for the consumers and regulator body. In this chapter most of the
explanations will be qualitative so that the principles behind the methods are clearly
demonstrated, instead of burying the notions under quantitative results.
As noted in the introduction, for the purposes of this thesis the regulator and the
government are the same entity. It is usual in the defense procurement arena that the only
consumer is the government and that the firms that provide goods and services enjoy a
certain degree of monopoly power because of being the sole provider of a specific
technology.
A. THE LOEB-MAGAT MODEL FOR MONOPOLIST REGULATION.
The Loeb-Magat mechanism for controlling a monopolist is based on the idea of a
tradeoff between an accurate estimate of the regulated industry's costs and government
surplus (or gain). In its basic form, the government gives up all its surplus in exchange for
the information about the marginal costs of the producer, to guarantee the allocative
efficiency of the outcome. The regulator fixes the price so it is equal to the "revealed"
marginal cost, in this way achieving the competitive outcome where the price paid by the
government equals to the marginal cost of providing the service or producing the good.
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To see the truth revealing nature of this mechanism, consider the situation shown in
Figure 1. The demand curve for the good or service is assumed known by both the
government and the producer of the good or service. The shaded area CBD represents the
profit (net revenue) that the company earns if it marginal cost is MCR, assumed to be the
true marginal cost (Total cost is area OABC, assuming that the marginal cost is constant
and there are no fixed costs). Consider now the situation where the company decides to
report a different cost, MCR,. Figure 2 shows the situation when MCR.>MCR. In this case,
the company earns a profit equal to the area HGBD, that is smaller than the amount
received if it reports MCR (Area HED). The solid triangle BEG represents the lost profit
due to the misrepresentation of the cost. Then, the firm has no incentive to overrepresent
costs, because it losses profit when it does.
Figure 3 summarizes both the cost overrepresentation and underrepresentation
situations. Triangle EGB is the lost profit due to underreporting the costs. Triangle LEJ is
the lost profit due to overreporting the costs. Therefore, it is in the own interest of the
company, if its goal is to maximize profits, to report the real marginal cost to the regulator.
The main problem with this approach is that the government gives away all its surplus,
although it receives the product or service at a competitive price level. A partial solution to
this problem is to charge the producer a fixed tax, high enough to recover most of the
surplus, but low enough to keep the mechanism useful. If the tax is too high, the company
may not cover its fixed costs, and the incentive structure designed to reveal the producer's
marginal cost breaks down. The additional information needed by the government is an
upper bound for the producer's marginal cost (UBMC). Since this information is kept
private by the firm, the government must rely on its belief about the UBMC to formulate
the purchasing policy.
Summarizing, the Loeb-Magat mechanism has the interesting property of compelling
the revelation of the producer's true marginal cost, assuming that the government and the
5
producer share the knowledge of the demand curve for the good or service, and that the
producer is able to determine its own marginal cost. Under the additional assumption that
the regulator is able to estimate an upper bound for the marginal cost, it is possible to
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Example of the application of the Loeb-Magat regulation model:
Reported marginal cost higher than real marginal cost.
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Example of the application of the Loeb-Magat regulation model:
summary of the truth revealing mechanism operation.
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B. THE BARON-MYERSON MODEL FOR MONOPOLIST REGULATION.
Baron and Myerson extended the Loeb-Magat model by requiring additional
assumptions about the unknown cost parameters of the regulated firm, and at the same time
offering a mechanism that enables the government to extract more rent from the firm. Both
methods share the same basic principle of truth revelation. The firm maximizes its profits
only if it reports its true cost parameter. The government uses the same Loeb-Magat model,
though to extract some rent from the firm, it does not use the real demand curve but a
modified purchasing plan derived from the demand curve and the statistical properties of
the unknown cost parameterl.
The Baron-Myerson (B-M) mechanism explicitly incorporates a transfer payment from
the government to the firm, although it may sometimes be negative (i.e., a tax). Also, the
B-M mechanism is posed as an optimization problem, where the firm's profit is given a
variable weight. The goal is to maximize the weighted sum of the expected government's
surplus and expected firm's profit. Notably, the method has a meaningful result even if the
expected firm's profits are given no weight in the optimization problem. If both expected
surpluses are given the same weight, the Loeb-Magat result is obtained. For the defense
procurement case, the most interesting case occurs when no weight is given to the expected
firm's profit, since the government would maximize its own expected gain.
The additional assumption required by B-M is the availability of an estimate of a
probability density function (or equivalently the cumulative distribution function) for the
cost parameter, instead of just the upper bound. This assumption is more challenging,
because the regulator will need much more information compared with the Loeb-Magat case
to formulate its belief about the unknown cost parameter.
Figure 4 shows an example of the application of the B-M mechanism. For this
example, the government does not know the marginal cost of the firm, and the fixed costs
1This interpretation of the Baron-Myerson mechanism comes from [Ref. 3]
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incurred are assumed to be zero. Also, the figure sets the origin of the price axis at the
lower bound for the marginal cost, and assumes that the upper bound of the marginal cost
is higher than the highest price that the government is willing to pay for the product or
service. These simplifications may be done without a loss of generality. The government
believes that the firm has a marginal cost that is distributed uniformly. The modified
purchasing plan depends on the original demand curve, the probability distribution function
for the unknown marginal cost and the weight given to the firm's profits in the overall
optimization problem. The gain for the government increases as the weight given to the
profit decreases, and is bigger than in the Loeb-Magat case. Since the B-M is conceptually
the same than the Loeb-Magat case, except for the use of a modified purchasing plan, the
truth revealing principle may be explained in a similar way. There is a deadweight loss
associated with the application of the method, due to a decrease in consumption. If the firm
reported its real costs without the forcing mechanism, the consumers would acquire QA.










Example of the application of the B-M regulation model: recovering
some of the consumer's surplus using a modified purchasing plan.
2 For other properties of the B-M mechanism, see [Ref. 21
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Summarizing, the B-M model is an extension to the Loeb-Magat model, requiring
estimates for: (i) the demand curve for the good or service; and (ii) a probability density
function for the unknown cost parameter. Using this additional information, the
government is able to extract rent from the firm and avoid giving up most of its surplus. In
the following section, a specific criteria will be defined to qualify a cost distribution
function when compared to another.
C. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION USED IN THE B-M MECHANISM.
Since one of the main topics of this thesis is to determine under which circumstances
the government is better off by choosing one cost parameter distribution over another, it is
necessary to clearly define the criteria used for the comparison of the distribution functions.
In this section one criterion is defined, though it is not necessarily the only criteria that may
be used to compare cost distribution functions.
Consider an unknown cost parameter E, that may take any value in the interval
[00,0 ]. Let Of and Eg be the unknown cost parameters that have the associated cumulative
distribution functions (c.d.f.) F(.) and G(.), respectively. Let f(-) and g(.) be their
respective probability density functions (p.d.f.).
1. First-order stochastic dominance.
A cumulative distribution function G(-) has first-order stochastic dominance over
the cumulative distribution function F(.) if:
G(O)_> F(O) VOe[Oo,, 11 (1)
To interpret equation (1), recall that G(O) is the probability that 8 g:O, Then (1)
can be rewritten as:
P(e, <- 0)- ŽP(er !5 0) VOe[00 ,,1] (2)
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Since G(.) and F(.) describe the cumulative probability distribution of cost
parameters 19g and Of respectively, equation (2) means that the cost parameter associated
with G(.) tends to have lower values than the cost parameter associated with F(.). Figure 5
depicts the relationship between F(-) and G(.). It is easy to see that G(0)>_F(0) implies that
the probability that eg has a value "near" 00 is higher than the probability that ef has a
value "near" 00. Similarly, the probability that ef has a value "near" 01 is higher than the














Example of first-order stochastic dominance of G(.) over F(-).
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2. Hazard rate dominance.
A cumulative distribution function G(.), with its associated probability
distribution function g(.), has hazard rate dominance over the cumulative distribution
function F(.) (and f(.) respectively) if-
g(o) 1f(o) VOE[OoO] (3)
G(0) F(0)
The quotient g(0•, or the hazard rate, has the following interpretation for theG(0)
context of this thesis 3: 01 represents the upper bound for the unknown cost parameter, and
it is assumed known for both the regulator and the producer. 01-0 represents the "cost
reduction" achieved by the producer due to its improved technology or efficiency or other
factor. G(0) therefore represents the probability that the "cost reduction" is at least 01-0.4
The probability that there are more than 01-0 "cost reductions" and less than 0 1-0+d0 "cost
reductions" is thus g(0)d0. Decreasing 0 from 01, g(8)/G(0) is the conditional
probability that there are no more "cost reductions" given that there have already been 01-0
"cost reductions". Then (3) requires that the conditional probability that there are no more
cost reductions relative to the known maximum cost parameter when the cost reduction is
already 01-0 is smaller for G(.) than for F(-).
If only equation (3) is satisfied, it can be said that G(-) is more favorable than
F(-). If both equations (1) and (3) are satisfied, then G(-) is strictly more favorable
than F(.). In other words, "...one distribution is [strictly] more favorable than another if it
puts more weight on more efficient types," this is, producers that have lower cost
parameters. [Ref. 3]
3 Adapted from [Ref. 41. pp. 66-67,77.
4 P(e" - 01 - 0) 4* P(E :5 0) = G(0), where E" is the random variable representing the cost
reduction,-
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3. Monotone hazard rate or log-concavity of a cumulative distribution
function.
If the c.d.f. associated with the random variable Of satisfies the following
condition:
d [FF9O] Ž L0! o 1d O
dOL f(O) dO L-F(O)J
Then the function F(-) is log-concave, and given the previous probabilistic
interpretation of the quotient f(O)/F(6), equation (4) states that the conditional probability
increases as the firm becomes more efficient. In this sense, this equation represents a
decreasing returns condition. This condition is satisfied by most usual distributions:
uniform, normal, etc. 5
5 This condition is adapted from [Ref. 41, where the assertion that the usual distributions (uniform, normal,
etc) comply with it, is made. In their paper, Baron and Myerson do not require the monotone hazard rate
condition to be true. However, assuming that this condition is valid, simplifies the mathematical treatment
of the problem.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF MISMATCH BETWEEN REALITY
AND BELIEF OF THE REGULATOR.
In Chapter II, the B-M method was explained in qualitative terms. In this chapter, a
more rigorous mathematical treatment is developed under the assumption that there is a
mismatch between the government's belief about the cost distribution function of the
unknown cost parameter and its real cost distribution function. First, the mathematical form
of the B-M model is developed as a framework for the subsequent analysis. This is
followed by the enunciation of the main theoretical results that predict the behavior of the
various measures of welfare that the government may use to determine its policy. Finally,
the theory is applied for a specific example, that allows a more intuitive appreciation of the
results.
A. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE B-M MECHANISM.
The government uses the Baron-Myerson mechanism to determine the pricing and
quantity of the product it will procure and the subsidy that the firm will receive. The
equations that determine the optimal policy are:G( 0)
Z,(0) = 0+(I - a)-
g(0) (5)
p(0) = co + C, Za(O) (6)
q(O) = Q(p(O)) (7)
10I If V(q(O))-p(O).q(9)_k0 +k,.z,(O)
r(O) = If V(q(O))- p(0) q(O) < ko + k, z-() (8)
t()= {(co + c, -.0).-q(O) +ko + k, -.0- p(O).- q(O)) -r(O) + .'r(ý) -(c, -.q(4)+ k,)d4
(9)
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E is the unknown cost parameter of a contractor, and 0 is a particular value that E may
take. The unknown cost parameter 0 may take values between O0 and 01, this is,
00:. 0_. 0,.
r(O) is the probability that the government will permit the contractor to do business at
all if it reports a cost parameter of 0. p(O) is the price that the government pays for the
goods, q(O) is the quantity that the government buys at p(O) and t(O) is the transfer (or
subsidy) that the firm receives from the government, all of these values when the firm
reports a cost of 0. a is the relative weight given to the contractor's surplus when the
government tries to maximize total surplus (05a5 1). If r 1, we have equal weight among
government and producer surplus. If a--O, the government only maximizes its own
expected gain.
P(-) is the inverse demand function, and Q(.) is the demand function. These functions
are defined as:
Q(p) =a-b.p and P(q)= a q (1O)
and V(q) is the total value to the government of an output quantity q, defined as:
q a .q2(11)V(q) = •P(4)d4 = a -q- I 2(1
0 b 2
The parameters co, cl, k0 and k1 are related to the cost function of the firm. The cost
function for producing a quantity q of the goods is:
C(q, 0) = (co + c. 0) q + + k. 0 (12)
Let f(O) be the p.d.f. for E, as it occurs in reality, this is, the contractor determines
that E is distributed according to f(O) from its privileged information about its technology,
effort, etc. Let F(O) be its associated c.d.f. Let g(0) be the p.d.f. that the government
assigns to 0, this is, the government believes that 0 is distributed according to g(0). Let
G(0) be its associated c.d.f. It will be assumed that f(.) and g(.) comply with the
15
monotone hazard rate assumption defined previously. This assumption simplifies the
analysis of the Baron-Myerson mechanism.
Let 0. be the solution to the equation:
V(q(O))- p(9). q(O) = ko + k, -z,(0) (13)
Since r(0) is a non-increasing function6 of 0, if 0<0* then the government allows the
firm to do business (i.e., r(0)=l). Otherwise, the government does not allow the firm to do
business and r(0)=O, t(O)=O and q(")=O. Therefore, 0* is a function of a, b, co, cl, ko, ki,
a, 00, 01, g(-) and G(.).
1. Expression for the expected government gain.
Let S(0) be the government surplus as function of the reported cost parameter 0.
Then, the following equation defines S(.) in terms of the previous equations.
S(W) = V(q(O)) - p(O). q(0) - t(0) (14)










If 0<0*, then it is possible to get an explicit expression for S(O):
a 12 Cq4 kjdS(O)=b q-- q - q-(co *c,0).q-ko-k,0+ p-q- ( )
(17)
6 See [Ref. 21 for other properties of the B-M mechanism.
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If equations (5)-(7) are substituted in (17), the following expression for S(O) is
derived:
S(O)-=K(O')(- (I- 2 G2() 2 l- (I - G(4-)g2(O) (18)
where
K( ") = -(k. 4.kO0) + 7 - -(CO + c1 0 ) 
(29
2( ba9
Finally, substituting (18) into (16), we get:
E[S(0)] = K(0")f. f(4)d4
bc,2 GG 2G(4) ~jG(ýT) df~
2 - (4) g2-- (l g) ) (20)
Note that:
G(4  "d4,f(ý, d = G(4) f (4"d
f ((2
and let
{0 If0"_ (22)0, = 10if * < 01 22
Then
E[S(O)j = K(O, )F(O,.)
a)• F( )G(4) f(4)d4
.or) gi(T)f• g- (23)
For simplicity of the analysis, two cases will be considered:
(a) Unknown variable cost and known fixed cost: In this case, co--0, c I= 1,
ko=ko and k1--O. In this case, the cost parameter E represents the unknown marginal cost,
while the government knows the fixed cost.
For this case, (13) is simplified to:
a k-_ +(I G(O)q(0") = 4-2k-b <"* • 0" =  - a)-- 24
bb g() (24)
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and K(O*) is now:
b (a _ 2 19 ( -ab G(O.)(_ .G(O. 22•
2_b2_;__ 0*)_ g(9* 1k)25)
(b) Unknown fixed cost and known variable cost: In this case, Co=co, cj=0,
ko=O and kI= 1. In this case, the cost parameter 0 represents the unknown fixed cost, while
the government knows the marginal cost.
For this simple case, the expected consumer gain is equal to:
E[S(0)] = K(6,)F(6,) (26)
where
2- b (27)
Unless specifically mentioned, the rest of the sections will refer to the first
case, the unknown marginal cost and known fixed cost.
2. Expression for the firm's expected profit.
The profit for the producer is:
r(O) = p(O). q(O)- C(q, 0) + t(O) (28)
ir(6) = f q()d4 => *(0) = -q(O) (29)
a
And the expected profit is:8, o, F(4) d
E[ r(9)] f Jr(4)f(4)dý = r(4)F(440 - f ) f(4)d4 (30)
Go 0o
The second part of the equality is obtained after integrating by parts. Since
F(0o)=O and Yr(O,) = 0, then:
, F(,F)4) F((4)
E[i(0)] = f(-r(4))f-4f(4)d•='q(•) f(4)d1 (31)
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B. IMPACT ON DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS OF WELFARE WHEN
THE GOVERNMENT VARIES THE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION.
It will be assumed now that the government does not know the real distribution
function for the cost parameter. In this section, the impact on the different measurements
that the government can use to guide its policy will be studied as a function of the selected
distribution, while the unknown real distribution remains the same.
A family of distributions is used to model the availability of different choices for the
selection of a distribution function for the unknown cost parameters. Let H(e,p) be a
cumulative distribution function family with the following properties:
(1) H(0,p) is log-concave for any p: • [(,. d dH(.,p)
(1)d H(O,p) gt 0 p.* dhO) >0 where ),p ,
d [H(O,p)1 I0=[ 0 h(O,p) 1<0
<-. P2 > P, * H(O,p2) > H(O,p,) V 0 r=[ 00, 0, ], this is, as p increases, theh( O, p2) h( O,p, )
cumulative function has greater hazard rate dominance.
(3) dH(O,p) > Ž0 4 , A t >p, =• H(OP 2) > H(O,p,) VO E [00, 0, J, this is, as p
dp
increases, the cumulative function has greater first-order stochastic dominance.
(4) H(O,pM)=F(O) V 0 •E[0 0,0,], this is, H(.,p) is identical to F(.) when P=PM. Since
F(.) is unknown, PM is also unknown.
Properties (1) through (4) describe a family of functions whose degree of
"favorability" is measured with the variable p. Also, the real (and unknown) distribution
function F(.) is a member of this family of functions. The government uses G(O)=H(Op)
as the selected distribution function to apply its purchasing policy.
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The government may use different criteria to select a specific policy represented by p:
(1) Select a distribution that maximizes expected government gain E[S(O,p)], this is,
select the value of p that maximizes E[S(0,p)], without giving any weight to the firm's
profit. This criterion requires that a--O.
(2) Select a distribution that maximizes the weighted sum of government gain and
producer's profit EJW] = E[S] + aE[trJ, where a is defined in the mathematical
formulation of the B-M mechanism. This is equivalent to say that the government will
select the value of p that maximizes E[W] = E[S]+ aE[,r].
(3) Select a distribution that maximizes the simple sum of government gain and
producer's profit E[W] = EIS]+ E[yr].
For the procurement case, the first criteria is used because the government is interested
in maximizing its own gain. However, it is still important to understand what implications
does the use of this criteria have on both the government and the firm.
The following theorems summarize the main results of this thesis. The demonstrations
are presented at the end of this chapter.
Theorem 1: For any value of a, the expected total welfare E[W] = E[S] + aEIIrI
has a global maximum at P=PM.
Corolar: If a=O, the expected government gain has a global maximum at P=PM.
Theorem 2: For any value of m the expected total welfare E[W] = E[S] + E['r] is a
non-increasing function of p.
Theorem ,3 For any value of a, the firm's expected profit is a non-increasing
function of p.
Theorem 4L The expected government gain tends to zero as p increases, when
P>PM. If P<PM, lir (H(O,p)/h(O,p)) = 0 and the fixed cost is small, then the expected
government gain tends to a value higher than zero as p decreases.
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These theorems have very important policy implications for the use of the Baron-
Myerson mechanism in the defense procurement arena.
If the government uses criterion (1) to select the distribution function for the cost
parameter, theorem's I corollary implies that the best outcome occurs when the government
has perfect information about the real distribution of the cost parameter, this is, the
government is able to determine how E is distributed although it still does not know the
real value of E. If the government chooses a distribution function that is less favorable than
the real distribution function and then it decides to increase its "favorability", then the
expected government gain will increase. On the other hand, if the government chooses a
distribution function that is more favorable than the real distribution function, and then it
decides to increase its "favorability", then the expected government gain will decrease. This
behavior, together with theorem 4, implies that the government may be better off by
choosing the distribution function "conservatively" (i.e., choose relatively less favorable
distributions). If it pushes the "favorability" of the distribution function over a certain limit
(if it pursues an "aggressive" policy), its expected gain may be lower than if it chooses a
"less favorable" distribution. This interpretation of theorem's 1 corollary also applies to
theorem 1 itself if the government uses criterion 2 to select the probability distribution.
Theorem 2 is interpreted as follows: as the "favorability" of the distribution function
increases, the overall expected welfare decreases. Theorem 2 can also be interpreted in
terms of a deadweight loss. If p=p , defines a baseline for welfare measurement, then any
the choice of p>pl diminishes total expected welfare, or, increases expected deadweight
loss.
Theorem 2 has also important implications for policy making. If the government is
uncertain about the real distribution and has risk aversion, it may decide to choose a
distribution function that is intentionally less favorable in relative terms, because it would
increase the overall expected welfare, though at the cost of its own gain. Other exogenous
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factors may also push in this direction of being "conservative" about the efficiency of the
firm, like job security, industry subsidies, etc.
Theorem 3 has important implications for the choice of c.d.f. and the incentive
structure that the B-M mechanism configures for the producer. First, the choice of a more
favorable c.d.f. reduces the rent of the producer, therefore the government may use this
procedure as a rent extraction tool. Unfortunately, this cannot be applied indefinitely,
because after a certain limit the government's actions in this dimension would also reduce
its own surplus.
Second, the producer has an incentive to lie about its true cost's c.d.f. when it tries to
influence the regulator. If the producer is successful, the government will choose a cost
distribution function that is less favorable than the real cost distribution function. Then, the
producer will profit more than if the government used the real cost distribution function.
Third, if a=O (no weight to the producer's profit in the maximization problem), the
incentive for the producer to behave strategically (i.e., lobbying effort) is greater, measured
in terms of the impact of a successful influence in the expected profit (See equation (5 1) in
the demonstration of theorem 3, below).
Summarizing, the form of an optimal policy will depend on which criterion the
government uses to select the distribution function. If it uses criterion I or 2, the
mechanism would yield the best outcome when the information about the real distribution
function is complete (i.e., the regulator is able to determine F(e)). If it uses criterion 3, the
government has an incentive to use "less efficient" distributions.
Now, if the first-best alternative is not achievable because of insufficient information
about the cost distribution (i.e. the regulator is not able to determine F(0)) , the second-best
alternative would depend on how expected surplus (or welfare) behaves on either side of
the optimum. The possibility of not doing business at all (because of the requirement of
extreme efficiency) suggests that the overall expected welfare will eventually decrease
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sharply as the regulator increases the "favorability" of the chosen c.d.f. On the other hand,
decreasing too much the "favorability" of the chosen c.d.f. puts in question the
effectiveness of the policy, and the government may be better off not using this mechanism
at all when there is a great uncertainty about the firm's costs, and instead using the Loeb-
Magat mechanism, that is much simpler to carry out. The following example should clarify
these options, although there will be a loss of generality.
C. EXAMPLE OF THE IMPACT OF C.D.F. CHOICE.
Consider the family of c.d.f.'s:
H(O,) = -000-P) P < ,00< : 01(32)
Clearly, H(00,p)=0 and H(0,p)=l. Then,
h(-,p) = - (33)
and
H(0,p) _ 0- 0o (34)
h(0,p) 1-p
This c.d.f. satisfies the properties described before:
d [= 0 -dp h(--,p) (I- l ) (36)
>0 (36)
S-H(,p) p= 1 .0 (37)
Lets assume that the real c.d.f is:
F(0) = 0 -0o = H(0,p = 0) (38)
Therefore, if p>O, H(0,p) is more favorable than F(0). Also, if p<0, H(0,p) is less
favorable than F(0). In this case, pM=O. F(0) is an uniform distribution, this is, the
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probability that the cost takes a value between 0 and O+dO is constant for any 0. If p>O,
the probability density function is skewed toward the lower bound of 9. If p<O, the
probability density function is skewed toward the upper bound of 0. Note that for p>O, the
slope of the p.d.f. is negative, while if p<O, the slope of the p.d.f. is positive.
H(0,p) may represent the cost distribution associated with an "efficient" firm (p>O),
an "inefficient" firm (p<O) or an "average" firm (p=O), and therefore is useful for the
comparison of different "types" of firms. The following figures (Figures 6 and 7) illustrate
H(0,p) and h(0,p) for p--0.5, 0 and -2.
Since H(0,p) is equal to F(0) when p--O, dE[Wy/dp--O at p--O, and the total welfare
is maximized. Theorem's I corollary implies that dE[S(O,p)]/dp--O at p--0, and a local
maximum is obtained for the expected government gain. Figures 8 and 9 show the expected
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For this example, the demand curve is Q(P)=l00-0.5.P and the fixed cost is zero. The
cost parameter E varies between 25 and 75. As it was predicted by theorem 2 and
theorem's 1 corollary, the slope of the expected profit is always negative and the expected
consumer surplus is maximized at p--0.
The next figure (Figure 10) shows the cutoff value for the cost parameter as a function
of p. It can be clearly seen that after a certain value of p, the government sometimes shuts
off the producer because its cost parameters are too high. This is consistent with the choice
of c.d.f. Higher values of p indicate that the regulator is interested in companies with low
cost parameters. Then, it is expected that the regulator will eventually stop production if it
requires more and more efficiency. As p approaches 1, the regulator's cost distribution
approaches an impulse function at 0=0 0 , and it will allow a business to produce only if
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Consider now the limit situation when p -- -co. In this case:
lir (H(O,p)/h(O,p)) = 0
lim-(S(,p)) = "+ ,- = 3906.25
lim(E4S(O,p))=-ko + ( -_) = 3906.25 (39)
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Let us compare these equations with the monopoly outcome. If the regulator decides
not to intervene, the firm will maximize its profits:dx
Max(x) =p.q- C(q) =, dz = 0 =O p + p'.q - C'(q) = 0 (40)
q dq
Using the demand curve and the cost function, equation (40) implies that for the
monopoly outcome:
S(O ,= b 1-
=0 ) (_e 3 (a _ 1 )3
=[(~ 2 ~4 b=b1419.27 (41)
Figure 9 shows the expected government gain as a function of the firm's cost
parameter. From this figure it is clear that the regulator is better off using a very
"unfavorable" cost distribution than letting the firm act as a monopolist. On the other hand,
this figure also shows that if the government uses a "very favorable" cost distribution
function, its expected gain will drop sharply after reaching the maximum. There will be a
value of p where the expected government gain using the B-M mechanism will be equal to
the expected government gain for the monopolist situation. Let us call this value Pc. If the
government chooses p>Pc, then it will be better off if it does not use the B-M mechanism.
This result is consistent with theorem 4 and the previous discussion about the second-
best choice of c.d.f., given the fact that the real distribution function is unknown.
Equations (39) and (41) and Figure 8 suggest that the regulator may be better off choosing
in a "conservative" way, this is, assuming a less efficient firm, than choosing in very
"optimistic" or "aggressive" way, because eventually the government will be better off if it
does not use the B-M model.
The condition lir (H(O,p)/h(O,p)) = 0 imposes strong restrictions for the selection
of H(O,p). However, if it holds in addition to the properties mentioned before for H(Op)
and the fixed cost is small, then the second-best choice for the government would be to
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choose a relatively "less efficient" cost distribution function, if the real cost distribution is
unknown. Otherwise, the government incurs the risk of choosing a c.d.f. that would
eventually close down the firm and the expected consumer surplus will be lower than the
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D. PROOF OF THE THEOREMS.
1. Proof of corollary of theorem 1.
To demonstrate that has an optimum at p=PM, it will be shown that the derivative
of the expected government gain with respect to p is equal to zero at P=PM, and that this
derivative is always non-positive for P>PM and always non-negative for p<PM. To obtain
an expression of LIS] as a function of p, G(.) is replaced with H(.,p) in (23). and
knowing that O, = O(p), then:
E[s(o,p)] = K(OC•(p))F(O•(p))
b h -a)(P 2 h(4,p) f (~) ) h(4,p) (42)
Taking the partial derivative of (42):dE[s(e,p)] =-2-[K(e (p))F(e•(p))]
dp dP C~r~~
.,,(I - aq rP ((l -a) H(4,p) F(4) H(4,p)f(),
-(I-a) H(O-(p),p) F(G(p)) H(O,(p),p) dO (p)
- b(l - a f I ()a 2 _h(9,(p),p) - f(e,.(p)) )ho,.(p),)""- dp
(43)
dE[S(O,p)]= (O, (p)) d )ko _ 2 (a _ F(())
dp dp 1- 2 b (br) f(ec (P))
-b(l - a)r()d[(~) (I - a) H(4,p). p L n(4,p) h(  f(4) )
_b(tl-a (1•a) H(O,(p),p) F(O,(p)) H(O,.(p),p)f(O ,,)) d,(p)2 -(j)p r(@,.( )) )h(O,(p),p) " " d p
(44)
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Using (24), the final expression for dE[S(O,p)]/dp is:
dE(S(9,p)] = I2 kOb f ( 0,(p)) 1~p)(I1-a) HOp,)_FO()dpdp )( H(Oh(),p) f(O,(p)))
(45)
Taking the total differential of (13), and solving for dO9(p)/dp (assuming that
0" < 0,), the following expression is obtained:
. d [H(O,p)
dO•(p) _dp h(Op)J#=.( <_0d [Hr(6,p)-
dp l+(l-a)-- 1 H.
)dOL h(ofp) J.,, (46)
(Note that this result for dO,(p)/dp is valid in the more general case where c0*0,
cll, kl*O.)
Equation (46) implies that a sufficient condition to determine the sign of
dE[S(O,p)]/dp is to determine the sign of (I - a)(H(O,p)/h(O,p)) - F(O)/f(O) for all
values of 0. If (1 - a)(H(O,p)/h(O,p)) - F(O)/f(O)<O for all 0, then dE[S(O,p)]/dp>O.
If a=O, then for P>PM, (1 - a)(H(O,p)/h(6,p)) - F(O)/f(6)<0 (dE[S(O,p)]/dp>0O), for
p<PM, (1-a)(H(O,p)/h(O,p))-F(O)/f(O)>O (dE[S(O,p)]/dp<O) and for p=PM,
(0 - a)(H(O,p)/h(O,p)) - F(O)/f(O)=O thus dE[S(O,p)]/Idp=0. These three conditions
are sufficient and necessary for E[S(9,p)] to have a maximum at P=PM when a---O.
For the unknown fixed cost case (case (b)), a similar result is reached. In this
scenario, dE[S(O,p)]/dp is:
dES(, p)] - f (0(p)) d, () a H(o,(p),p) F(o,.(p))"dp p h(Ojp),p) f(,()) (47)
Again, it is clear that if at=O, dE[S(O,p)]/lp--O when P=PM and E[S(O,p)] is
maximized. Il
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2. Proof of theorem 3.
The demonstration of theorem 3 follows the same reasoning that the
demonstration of theorem's 1 corollary. The expected profit as a function of p is:
9p .(P)
, f( (48)
Taking the derivative of E[iW(6,p)]:
d [El r( Op)]= ' d*(ý,p) F(4) f(4)d + (-i(Oe,p))F(O,.)do'.
dP f~ dp f(4~) dp (9
Since q(Oop) = 2kb (if 0*<01) and:
r = q = a) d s(o,p)
dp dp dp Lh(-G,-p) (50)
Then:
d = - a O H(,p)I F(•L),f(, + (O)-do-
dp 0 Bdp jh(-,p) JRf~) dp
(51)
Therefore, dE[ir(O,p)J/dp <0, because of (46) and property (2) of H(0,p).i
3. Proof of theorem 1.
To prove theorem one it is necessary to show that:
ElW] = E[S]+ aE[ r (52)
Has a maximum at P=PM. Taking the derivative of E[W] with respect to p:
dE[W] = dE[S] +a dE[;rl
dp dp (53)
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Using equations (45) and (51), the following expression is obtained for
dE[W]/dp:
dE[W] V-2b (.() dec(p)r a H(8 ,p) F(6,) +aF(6r)1
dpdp h(6Op) f(8,.) f(6O)
- b(l - a)J+ (I J a)'P ~f+ ()f(4)
(54)
dp 2kb(~pX-)dp Lh(O,,p) f(Qc)J
O' p d [H(ý,p) iFH(4,p) F(4) f)d
-b(l -a) 2 JI f(4 I
Equation (55) implies that a sufficient condition to determine the sign of
dE[WJ/dp is to determine the sign of H(6,p)Ih(8,p) - F(8)/f(9) for all values of 0.
If H(6,p)Ih(6,p) - F(8)/f(8)•O0 for all 0, then dE[W]/dpŽ-O. Then for p>pm,
H(O,p)/h(8,p) - F(6)/f(8)!5O (dE[WJ/dp2ŽO), for p<PM. H(O,p)/h(O,p) - F(8)/f(0)2!O
(dE[WI/dp•O0) and for p=PM, H(6,p)/h(6,p) - F(O)/f(9)=O thus dE[W]/dp=O at
p=pm. These three conditions are sufficient and necessary for dE[WJ/dp to have a
maximum at p~pm for any ot.IJ
4. Proof of theorem 2.
Using equations (45) and (51), the following expression is obtained for
dE[S+ ir]/dp:
d~f+'I']- 2k~b-f(9,(p))(1 -a) d6,(p) H(Qc,p)
dp dp h(O(.,p)
-dpI- ) f h(9 H ,p)] J H(4,p) (56) :,
Then theorem 2 follows immediately.U
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5. Proof of theorem 4.
Property (2) of H(Op) and equations (5) and (6) imply that when p increases the
prices that the government pays also increase, eventually reaching levels that are higher
than the monopolist pricing. If p is increased even more, the firm will eventually be shut
down. This follows from equation (46). Then, it is clear that the expected government gain
will tend to zero as p increases, because the gain of the government when firm is not
allowed to do business is equal to zero.
Also, since by hypothesis lir (H(O,p)/h(O,p))= 0 and from equations (5) and
(6), the expected government gain tends to the value obtained by using the Loeb-Magat
mechanism as p decreases.
This condition may be expressed in a more rigorous way.
lir (H(O,p)/h(6O,p)) = 0 implies that:
lir z" (O)= 0 (57)
lir p(O) = 0 (58)
lim (E[S(Op)]) = -ko + b -a ,01 (59)
Therefore, if the fixed cost is small, the right side of equation (59) is positive.J
34
IV. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR THE REGULATOR.
In the previous chapter it was assumed that the regulator did not know what was the
real distribution function for the unknown firm's cost parameter. It will now be assumed
that the regulator has somehow determined two alternative distribution functions for the
cost parameter, and has to decide which one to use to maximize some measurement of
welfare. This scenario is suitable for the use of a strategic payoff matrix. In the following
sections this matrix is built for two different measurements of weltlre: expected
government gain and producer's expected profit.
A. CONDITIONS FOR SELECTING THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
TO OBTAIN A DOMINANT STRATEGY FOR THE REGULATOR.
Lets assu'.ie now that the regulator has two choices for g(-) (and implicitly G(.)):
g(O)=f ,(; ?'0) = ff2 (0) (60)
because it believies that the company has two possible distributions for E.
We can define four values for the expected government gain, depending on the




Real distribution 4- g(0)=f 1 (0) g(0)=f2(0)
f(O)=fi(0) EI[S(O)] E_2[S(e)]
f(O)=f 2 (0) E21[S(0)] E22[S(O)]
Strategic payoff matrix for the government when there are two different
probability functions to choose from.
Table 1 represents the strategic payoff matrix for the government if it chooses to
measure welfare in terms of its own expected gain.
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It will be a dominant strategy for the government to choose g(0)=f2(0) if:
(E12[S(0)]> Et[S(0)]) and (E221S(o)]> E2 ,[S(0)1) (61)
because it maximizes its expected gain whatever the real distribution is.
The conditions expressed in (61) can be expanded using equation (23):El2[() > E,,I[S(0)]




K(0,2 )Fr2 (012 )-K(0c,)F 2(Ol)-b(1-af f 0 2,2(4)f2(4)d4- f21,(0-f2(ý)d" >0
L0 00 o
(63)
Where ,1 and 0c2 are defined by (22) using fl(') and f2(-) respectively to solve for
6* and:
-j'(O i - a) Fj (0) F1()FO (64)
2 fi(O) fI(e)f) f((6)
1. Analysis of the strategic dominance for a simple case.
Lets assume now that a, b, ko, a, 00, 01, fl('), f2 (.), FI(.) and F 2(.) are such
that 0,, and 0,2 are equal to 01, this is, the government is interested in doing business with
the contractor in the whole range of values for 0. Then, equations (62) and (63) are
reduced to:
E,2[S(O)J > E,,[S(0)] = f(I1.,(4)- 41D,2(()). f, (4)d4 >0 (65)
0,
E22[S()]> E21[S(0)] = f((12,.(4)- 'V2,2(4)).f 2(4)d4 >0 (66)
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Substituting (64) into (65) and (66):
(l+a)9' F,(ý) F 2(4))(FI(t)(l-a)F2 (4))f(•d•>0 (67)
*2 (0l'- ) f,2(4) f,(4) (1+ ,(a ) f ""
and
(1+a )( F,(•) F2(4))((Il-a)F,()- F2(4))f,2 (4)d4 >0 (68)
2 '. (4) f,(4) (l+a)f,(4) f 2 (4)
If a--O, this is, the regulator does not consider the producer's surplus when
applying B-M, (67) and (68) cannot be simultaneously valid, because:
F'(t) F2(4)) f (4)d4 <0 (69)0" f 1(4)f24
and
9'(FI(4) F2(4))' 2f(ý)d > 0 (70)
Equation (70) is always valid, while equation (69) is never valid. Therefore, if
a--O, it is not possible for the regulator to choose a probability distribution function for the
B-M mechanism that constitutes a dominant strategy in the sense described above. The
regulator must use a different criteria to determine if one probability distribution is "better"
than other. This condition follows directly from theorem's I corollary.
2. Analysis of the strategic dominance for the general case.
The more general case (Equations (65) and (66)) may be analyzed using the
results of the previous chapter. Lets assume that F 2(0) is more favorable than F&(').
Consider first the case where f(')=fj('). From equation (51) it is clear that the maximum
expected consumer surplus will be obtained for F 2(-) more favorable than Fl('), but if
F 2(0) is much more favorable than Fl(.), then the expected consumer surplus will
ultimately decrease. Therefore, without more conditions it is not possible to determine if
E[S(6)]> E1,[S(0)]. Lets assume now that f(.)=f2(.). Again, from equation (51) it is
clear that the condition expressed in equation (63) will always be valid. Therefore, the
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strategic dominance of the choice of f2(') over fl(.) will depend ultimately on the relative
degree of "favorability" of f2(') over fl('), as expressed by equation (62). This result is
consistent with the findings of the previous chapter.
Consider now an extension of the simple case. Equation (67) will hold if:
S_> (l-a)F2 (4) (71)f14 (1i+ a) f 2(4j)
The function w(a) = (1 - a)/(l + a) varies between 0 (when a= 1) and 1 (when
a=0). The simple case described above shows that if a-=O, there is no dominant strategy,
therefore (x will be considered greater than zero. Let fj(0)=H(0,pI) and f2(0)=H(O,p 2),
with P2>P I, and H(O,p) defined by equation (64) in the previous chapter. Then, the
condition expressed by equation (71) will hold if P2 :5 1 - ((1 - a)/(l + a))(l - p,). This
relation limits the increase of "favorability" that the regulator may use, to have a dominant
strategy.
If the government uses criterion (1) (from Chapter III) as a basis to select a cost
distribution function, this result indicates that there will be never a dominant strategy for the
government under these circumstances.
B. IMPACT OF THE STRATEGIC CHOICE IN PRODUCER'S UTILITY.
Table 1 represents the effect of the choice in the expected consumer surplus. It is
possible to build a similar table for the producer's expected profit:
TABLE 2
SGovernment's beie
Real distribution ,, g(O)=fW(O) g(O)=f2(O)
f(0)=fl(0) E, [ ,(0)] EE['r 2(0)]
f(0))=I'2(0) E2[;r,(O)] E2[y(0)]
Strategic payoff matrix for the producer when the government chooses




Yr.(0)= qg (4)d4 (72)
with qg(4) calculated using g(') and G(.), and
Ed[xg(O)] = f Jr'(4)dF(4) = F*,(4)" F(4)j' - f *g(4)F(4)d4 = -i'(ý)F(4)d4
80 *o 0
(73)
because F(0o)=O and ; (0,) = 0. Equation (72) implies that:
*;(O)=-q3 (O)<0 (q(O)>O VOE[0o0,0,]) (74)
for all 0 < O.
Letscalculatenow A, = E,[7r,(0)]- E,[;r2(O)] and A2 =E2[jr,(0)]- E2 [r 2(O)].7
O*l 0c2
A = f- F.(4)d4 + f*2(4)F,(4)d4 (75)
Oo #0
0c2 ecI
A, = f(*2(F, (4)d4F+()d -+ J-,(4)F,(4)d4 (76)
00 Oc2
0,2 eel
Al = f-(q2 (0)-q,(O))F,(,4)d4 + j-*,( )F,(4)d4 (77)
Under the assumption that F 2(') is more favorable than Fl(-), we know that O., >_ 0,2
and q l(0)>q2(0), therefore the first term of equation (77) is positive and because of (46),
the second term of the equation is also positive. Thus, A_>O.
o OA2 = - fJ*1(4) F 2 (04d + fJ* 2 (4)F 2 (N4d (78)
8,2 Oel
A2 = f (*2() - *,(ý))F 2 (0)d4 + -*1,(4)F 2(0)d4 (79)
90, 0,.2
A2 = f-(q 2(0)-q,(0))F2(4)d4 + f- 1 (4)F 2 (0)4• (80)
Oo 09,2
From (80), A2-0 also. Therefore, the producer is always better off if the government
uses a less favorable p.d.f. Even more, if it is assumed that F2(.) is strictly more favorable
"
7This analysis is similar to the one conducted in [Ref. 41, pp. 81.
39
than Fl(.), then A2-A1 _>O (subtract (77) from (79), and use F 2(.)>Fj(.)). This condition
means that the loss for the producer is greater when the producer is more efficient,
therefore the more efficient the producer, the more incentive he has to convince the
regulator to use a less favorable p.d.f. to apply B-M.
As it was predicted by theorem 3 of Chapter III, the government will always face the
resistance of the producer when choosing a dominant strategy. The conditions represented
by Table 2 will be valid for all the criteria that the government may use to determine what
distribution function it selects for the application of the B-M mechanism.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
The results obtained in this thesis provide interesting insights about the effects of the
choice of a probability density function on the outcome of the application of the Baron-
Myerson mechanism to the defense procurement process. First, theorem 1 and its corollary
show the importance of having a good knowledge about the firm's privileged information,
because it allows the optimization of the government's gain. Second, theorems 2 and 3
elucidate the impact of a change in policy both in total welfare and in the firm's profit,
delineating the incentive structure that the Baron-Myerson mechanism creates. Finally,
theorem 4 suggests what the effects on the credibility of the policy may be, when there is a
high degree of uncertainty about the firm's private information.
The strategic implications of these theorems are very important. Theorem 3 predicts
that the producers will be always complaining about their high costs, trying to influence the
government so that it reduces the expectations about the efficiency of the processes
involved in the manufacture of the goods or services that are being procured. This raises
the credibility issue for the contractor. The government should not believe in the
information about the probability density functions for the cost parameter that the producer
provides, because the firm has clear incentives to misrepresent it. Note that this does not
mean that the Baron-Myerson is not successful in making the contractor reveal its true cost.
It means that the firm has an incentive to influence the government in its favor, before it
applies the regulation mechanism.
On the other hand, theorems I and 2 create a credibility problem for the government.
The contractor will ultimately determine that if the government insists in requiring high
efficiency, the outcome for the government may be less desirable than if it reduces the
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efficiency requirements. This tradeoff between pursuing an aggressive policy (pushing for
high efficiency firms) and pursuing a conservative policy (allowing low efficiency firms to
operate with acceptable profit levels) may be addressed using theorem 4. If the government
has a degree of risk aversion, theorem 4 suggests that it should pursue conservative
policies when the uncertainty about the real distribution function is high, because of the
impact of requiring high efficiency in the expected government gain.
These conclusions suggest that, if the government believes that it has a good estimate
of the probability distribution of the cost parameter, it should use the B-M model with this
estimate. On the other hand, if it has doubts about the accuracy of the estimate, it would be
better off by pursuing a more conservative approach. When the level of uncertainty is even
higher, the government may use a simpler regulation mechanism such as Loeb-Magat.
The limits that separate these three alternatives are not clearly defined. To clarify them,
further research should be conducted to determine the behavior of the outcome in the
neighborhood of the optimum. Also, new measurements may be developed to assess the
degree of uncertainty about the firm's private information. In this sense, theorem 4 is too
restrictive to allow a more generalized study of the outcome of the procurement process.
Also, some research could be conducted to determine the dynamic characteristics of the
process, specially because a dynamic analysis may improve the estimates of the firm's
privileged information8. This step is beyond the goals of this thesis.
Summarizing, this thesis has achieved its goals, because it provides an insightful
analysis of the effects of the choice of probability distribution on the outcome of the
application of the Baron-Myerson mechanism to the defense procurement process. It also
provides a starting point for further research in the area.
8From Control Systems theory, the greater the number of observations available from an unknown system,
the greater the possibility for determining its behavior and parameters. See for example [Ref. 51, ch.3,
where the prediction and observability of a linear system is discussed.
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